It is proposed that there are group differences in suppression skill, and one such grouping is the distinction between more \ersus less skilled university-aged comprehenders. Experiments supporting this proposal and demonstrating that university-aged adults differ in their ability to suppress irrelevant, inappropriate. poten tially interfering information are reviewed. Many of these experiments have been replicated with other groups, which also hypothetically differ in their ability to suppress inappropriate information. Two new sets of experiments are reviewed. In one, the prediction that less skilled comprehenders-because they are less skilled at suppression-should be better at comprehending puns is evaluated. In the other, the predic tion that less skilled comprehenders-because they are less skilled at suppression-are better able to shift to a different meaning of a homonym is evaluated. Both sets of data are evaluated with respect to a general slowing explanation and scaling artifacts.
groups, which also hypothetically differ in their ability to suppress inappropriate information. Two new sets of experiments are reviewed. In one, the prediction that less skilled comprehenders-because they are less skilled at suppression-should be better at comprehending puns is evaluated. In the other, the predic tion that less skilled comprehenders-because they are less skilled at suppression-are better able to shift to a different meaning of a homonym is evaluated. Both sets of data are evaluated with respect to a general slowing explanation and scaling artifacts.
Neonates are not the only ones who experience a blooming, buzzing, bustle of confusion. In many situations, irrelevant or inappropriate information is activated, unconsciously re trieved, or naturally perceived. If we are to comprehend successfully what is going on about us in the world, inappropriate or irrele vant information must not be allowed to affect our ongoing cognitive processes; it must be quickly suppressed.
Suppression is the dampening or attenuating of activation. Suppression contrasts with inhibi tion, which is the blocking of activation. Con sider the analogy of a candle. If igniting the can dle' s flame is analogous to activation, then any action that impedes or obstructs that ignitionfor instance, wetting the wick or reducing the environmental oxygen-is analogous to inhibi tion. In contrast, snuffing out the already ignited flame is analogous to suppression. As this anal ogy suggests, a crucial difference between sup pression and inhibition is whether the metaphorical candle is lit. Suppression requires a flame to dampen (i.e., it requires that the mental informa tion is already activated in order for it to be sup pressed). Suppression can lead to inhibition, as in the case of negati1·e priming (e.g., Tipper, 1985 ; for a review see May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995) , where ignoring a distractor on one trial (suppression) makes that stimulus harder to acti vate on a subsequent trial (inhibition); however, suppression and inhibition are distinct phenom ena.
Suppression and inhibition should also be distinguished from interference. Interference also arises from activated mental represen tations; it requires activated mental representa tions that, by definition, are interfering. To re turn to the candle analogy, interference is the already ignited flame that in a perfect world would be extinguished because it is inappropri ate, irrelevant, or otherwise disruptive. There fore, by definition, interference cannot be inhib ited but it can be suppressed.
of the sentence that they had just read, and we compared that to how long participants took to decide that the same word did not fit the meaning of a comparison sentence, such as ''He dug with the shovel."
When we presented the test words immedi ately after participants read the sentences, we observed that both the more and less skilled comprehenders took longer to reject a test word that was related to the inappropriate meaning of the sentence-final homonym than they did to reject the same test word when it followed an unrelated sentence. This result suggests that ac tivation from the inappropriate meanings was causing interference for both the more and less skilled comprehenders, at this immediate test interval. However, when we presented the test words 850 ms after participants read the sen tences, the more skilled comprehenders no lon ger showed any interference. and this suggests that the more skilled comprehenders had suc cessfully suppressed the inappropriate meanings of the homonyms. The less skilled comprehen ders, however, were still experiencing interfer ence even after the 850 ms delay. We concluded that less skilled comprehendcrs are less able to quickly suppress the inappropriate meanings of homonyms.
REPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In another experiment (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991 , Experiment I) less skilled comprehenders were less able to quickly suppress the inappro priate forms of homophones. In this experiment the critical sentences contained a homophone, for example, "He had lots of patience," and the test word was related to the other form of the homophone, for example, CALM. Again we found that immediately after participants read the sentences, both the more and less skilled comprehenders took longer to reject a test word like CALM following a sentence like "He had lots of patience" than they did to reject the same test word following a sentence that did not con tain a homophone, for example, "He had lots of students." Thus, both more and less skilled comprehenders immediately experienced inter-
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ference caused by the activation of the inappro priate forms of the homophones. After a delay of 1000 ms, the more skilled comprehenders no longer showed interference but the less skilled comprehenders did. It was concluded that less skilled comprehenders were less able to quickly su ppress the inappropriate forms of homo phones.
In yet another experiment (Gernsbacher & Faust. 199 1, Experiment 3) less skilled compre henders were less able to quickly suppress the activation of a related picture when they were reading a word, and they were less able to q uickly suppress the activation of a related word when they were viewing a picture. In this exper iment participants first viewed a context display which contained a word superimposed on a line drawing of a common object, for instance, the word MONTH superimposed on a picture of a broom. Prior to viewing each context display, the participants were told either to focus on the word and ignore the line drawing or to focus on the line drawing and ignore the word. (Indeed, the participants were strongly encouraged to ignore the to-be-ignored item; they were told that the task would be much easier if they did ignore to the to-be-ignored item.) After viewing each context display, the participants were shown a target display. Each target display con tained either a word or a line drawing. If the trial was one in which the participants were to focus on the word in the context display and ignore the line drawing, the target display also contained a word, and the participants' task was to decide whether the two words were related. If the trial was one in which the participants were to focus on the line drawing in the context display and ignore the word, the target display also con tained a line drawing, and the participants' task was to decide whether the two line drawings were relate d.
Both more and less skilled comprehenders immediately had difficulty rejecting a target dis play if it contained a word that was related to the to-be-ignored line drawing (e.g., rejecting the word SWEEP as not being related to the word MONTH when SWEEP was superimposed on a line drawing of a broom, as opposed to a line drawing of a sandwich). However, after a 1000 ms delay, only the less skilled comprehenders continued to show interference from the should be-ignored picture.
This pattern of everyone experiencing imme diate interference, regardless of comprehension skill. followed by attenuated interference for more skilled comprehenders, is the basis of the claim for group differences in suppression skill.
Moreover, this pattern has been replicated by colleagues around the world with whom stimuli have been shared. For example, Twilley and Dixon ( 1997) at the University of Alberta repli cated this pattern using our measure of compre hension skill. Long, Seely, and Oppy (1997) (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1995) . Baumbaertner. Lehman, and Fossett ( 1997) found that adults with right-hemisphere damage showed less efficient suppression compared with age-matched participants without known neuro logical impairment.
In all the data reviewed, all participants showed initial interference, which is crucial for defining suppression. Furthermore, in all cases, the members of the population that were hypoth esized to suffer from less efficient suppression showed continued interference. Although it is tempting to conclude that all of these situations reflect a similar deficit in suppression skill, fur ther empirical investigation is required.
however, that less versus more skilled compre henders were not less able to reject the contextu ally inappropriate meanings of homonyms just because they did not know what was appropri ate. Less skilled comprehenders performed as well as more skilled comprehenders when the task was to accept the appropriate meaning of a homonym, for example. when their task was to correctly say yes that the test word ACE was related to the sentence, '·He dealt the spade." Thus. the group differences appear to be attrib utable to our putative mechanism of suppression (of inappropriate or irrelevant information), not enhancement (of appropriate or relevant infor mation).
WHEN LESS IS STILL WORSE
Together these experiments suggest that less skilled comprehenders are less able to suppress inappropriate information. However, these ex periments, and in particular the ones that use homonyms in their stimuli. lead to a rather unintuitive prediction: If less skilled comprehenders are less able to suppress the inappr op ri ate meanings of homonyms, then -ironic ally_ less skilled comprehenders might be better th an more skilled comprehenders at understan ding puns. To understand a pun such as '·Two men walk into a bar and the third man ducks, " one has to keep activated the inappropriate meani ng of the word bar -the meaning not implied b)
the typical joke scenario of two men walk ing into a tavern. But intuition suggests that more skilled comprehenders should be more skilled at comprehending puns. Research directly tested this intuition (Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995 ) . We developed a task that measured ho w quickly more versus less skilled comprehenders could identify a meaning of a homonym that was not implied by the immediate context. Partici pants were told that they would read a series of sentences, and following each sentence they would see a test word on which they would make a judgment. There were two tasks that all participants performed. and the two tasks were separated into two blocks.
For one task, participants judged whether the test word was related to a meaning of the final word of the sentence, but that meaning was not the meaning implied by the sentence. So, for example, after reading the sentence, "He dug with the spade," if participants were tested with the word ACE they should have responded yes.
because ACE is related to one meaning of spade, but ACE is not related to the meaning of spade that is implied in "He dug with the spade." In the block of trials for which partici pants performed this task, there were 20 trials such as this, in which the correct response was yes (i.e., the test word was related to a meaning of the sentence-final word, but not related to the meaning implied by the sentence). In the block of trials for which participants performed this task, there were also 20 trials in which the cor rect answer was no. On half of those trials. the test word was unrelated to both the sentence tina! word and the sentence itself. as the word ACE is to the sentence, "He dug with the shovel." For the remaining half of the trials in this block for which the correct answer was no, the test word was related to one meaning of the sentence-final word, but that was the meaning There were also 20 trials for which the correct answer was no. On half of those trials. the test word was unrelated to either the sentence-final word or the sentence itself. as the word ACE is to the sentence, "He dug with the shovel." And for the remaining half of the trials for which the correct answer was no, the test word was related to a meaning of the sentence-final word but that was not the meaning implied by the sentence.
for example, the test word ACE following the sentence, "He dug with the spade."
We tested 40 more skilled and 40 less skilled comprehenders, whom we selected on the basis of their performance on the multimedia compre hension battery. Half the participants of each skill level completed a block of 40 trials performing one task first. and then a block of 40 trials performing the other task, and we counterbalanced the order of the two blocks.
Participants were unaware that there would be a second block of trials, and hence a second type of task, until they completed the first block of trials. Therefore, they were not given the in structions for a second task until they had com pleted all the trials performing one task. During the entire experiment, each test word was pre sented at a long delay -1000 ms after its sen tence disappeared. Participants practiced on 20 sentences using the task they would be perform ing for that block. During the experiment, they were given feedback after each trial as to whether their responses to each test word were correct or incorrect. We analyzed data only from participants who performed with greater than 70% accuracy.
Of primary interest was participants' perfor mance on the trials for which they should have responded yes; these trials demonstrated partici pants' ability to accept inappropriate meanings and their ability to accept appropriate meanings.
When the task required correct! y accepting test words related to the inappropriate meanings (i.e., respond yes that a test word was related to a meaning of the sentence-final word but not related to the sentence, for example, responding yes to ACE after reading the sentence, "He dug with the spade"). the less skilled comprehenders responded significantly less rapidly (M = 1235 ms, SE = 45 ms) than did the more skilled comprehenders (M = l 04 7 ms; SE = 44 ms). These data suggest that less skilled compre henders are not more able to correctly accept inappropriate meanings (as one has to do to comprehend a pun).
In contrast, when the task was to correctly accept an appropriate meaning of a homonym (i.e .. respond yes that a test word was related to the sentence-final word and was related to the sentence). the two skill groups' response times did not differ reliably (M = 914 ms, SE = 38 ms for the less skilled; and M = 865 ms, SE = 34 ms for the more skilled). This finding replicates our previous work that showed that more versus less skilled comprehenders do not differ on a task where they have to identify the appropriate meanings of homonyms (i.e., there are not any
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pronounced group differences attributable to our putative mechanism of enhancement). This last result, as well as others from our laboratory and others' laboratories. opposes a general slowing account of group differences in suppression skill. We and others have found that poorer comprehension-and by extension. sup pression -skill is not always manifested in slower response times on our laboratory tasks. As in the data just reviewed, the less versus more skilled comprehenders · response times differed on one task (when the task was to ac cept the inappropriate meanings of homonyms)
but not another task (when the task was to ac cept the appropriate meanings of homonyms). Note that these data are not difference scores but "raw" reaction times; thus the interpretation is not prone to the problems inherent with differ ence scores.
Although response times differed between the two skill groups on one task, but not on the other, participants in the two skill groups did not differ in their accuracy on the two tasks. Their accuracy rates were 85% and 84%, for the more versus less skilled comprehenders, when the task was to correctly accept an appropriate meaning of a homonym and their reaction times differed, and 93% and 91% for the more versus less skilled comprehenders when the task was to accept the appropriate meanings of homonyms and their reaction times did not differ. Thus, the interaction we found for response time did not result from a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Neither did the interaction appear to be a scaling artifact, such that the slower the average response time the larger the difference between the two groups. When we examined a type of trial on which participants in both skill groups responded an average 150 ms slower (viz., no items in the related-to-word-not-related-to-sen tence task) than they responded on the type of trial for which we found group differences (viz., yes items in the related-to-word-not-related-to sentence task), the difference between the two groups nonetheless remained around 200 ms (M = 1298 ms for the less skilled, M = I 096 ms for the more skilled). In other words, even when both groups responded an average 200 ms more slowly, the difference between the two groups was not (proportionately) larger.
Similarly, when we examined a type of trial on which both skill groups responded an averag e 100 ms more slowly than they responded on the type of trial for which we did not find group dif ferences (viz., yes items in the related-to-word and-related-to-sentence task), the difference be tween the two groups was even smaller (M " lOl l for the less skilled. M = 974 for the more skilled), and still statistically unreliable. Thus, even when both groups responded 100 ms more slowly, the difference between the two groups was smaller. Support for this hypothesis was provided in the same data set (Gernsbacher & Robertson. 1995) . In the block of trials for which the partic ipants' task was to judge whether a test word was related to the sentence-final word but not related to the sentence there was a type of trial for which participants had to say no to the ap propriate meaning. For example, they had to reject the test word ACE following the sentence.
"He dealt the spade." To respond correctly to these trials, that is say no, participants need to
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1 reject the appropriate meaning, and again we ob served a dtfference between the more versus tess skilled comprehenders. Indeed, the less skilled comprehenders again responded more slo wly than the more skilled comprehenders on this type of trial, when they had to reject or sup-1 press an appropriate meaning. The difference ' was just as great as when they had to accept an in appropriate meaning. Thus, less skilled comprehenders · greater difficulty in accepting an inappropriate meaning might be due to their greater difficulty in suppressing an appropriate meaning. the point being that groups differ in suppression skill. I sentences included 24 pairs of experimental sen tences. We called these sentences experimental pairs because the first sentence of each pair was our prime sentence, and the second sentence of each pair was our target sentence. We manipu lated the prime sentences and measured the ef fect of our manipulation on participants' responses to the target sentences. For example, the target sentence, "She blew out the match", was preceded by one of three prime sentences.
WHEN LESS IS BETTER
In the same-meaning prime condition. the prime sentence implied the same meaning of the hom onym that the target sentence implied, as in the prime sentence, "She lit the match'', preceding the target sentence, "She blew out the match".
In the neutral-meaning prime condition, the prime sentence was uninformative about the meaning of the homonym, as in the prime sen tence, "She saw the match", preceding the tar get sentence, "She blew out the match". In the different-meaning prime condition, the prime sentence implied a different meaning of the homonym than the target sentence implied, as in the prime sentence, "She won the match", pre ceding the target sentence, "She blew out the match".
We considered participants' responses to tar get sentences after they read neutral prime sen tences as a baseline, and we predicted that par ticipants would reap a benefit from reading a prime sentence that implied the same meaning of the homonym as the meaning implied by the subsequent target sentence. We also predicted that participants would incur a cost from reading a prime sentence that implied a different mean ing of the homonym as implied by the subse quent target sentence. Indeed, that is what was observed. By subtracting participants' response times to target sentences after they read same meaning primes (M = 1107 ms, SE = 29 ms) from their response times to target sentences after they read neutral-meaning primes (M = 1195 ms, SE = 35 ms), we quantified the amount of benefit that participants reaped; a statistically reliable 88 ms. By subtracting participants' re sponse times to target sentences after they read neutral-meaning primes (M = 1195 ms, SE = 35 ms) from their response times to target sentences after they read different-meaning primes (M = 1281 ms, SE = 41 ms), we quanti fied the amount of cost that participants incurred; a statistically reliable 86 ms.
We also quantified these costs and benefits using participants' error rates. By subtracting participants· error rates on target sentences after they read same-meaning primes (M = II%. SE = I%) from their error rates on target sentences after they read neutral-meaning primes (M = 17%, SE = 2%), we quantified the amount of benefit that participants reaped; a statistically reliable 6'7c. By subtracting participants' error rates on target sentences after they read neutral meaning primes (M = 17'7c, SE = 2%) from their error rates on target sentences after they read
we quantified the amount of cost that partici pants incurred; a statistically reliable 8'7c.
We included participants' data only if they responded correctly to both the prime sentence and its subsequent target sentence. On average, participants made 9'7c of their errors on the prime sentences; however, there were no differ ences in how frequently participants responded incorrectly to the same-meaning, neutral-mean ing, or different-meaning primes (although. of course, there were differences in how accurately participants responded to the targets in these three conditions).
Why are these benefits reaped and these costs incurred? I assume that after participants com prehend the sentence, "She lit the match," the firestick meaning of match is enhanced, and the contest meaning is suppressed. After partici pants comprehend the sentence, "She won the match." the contest meaning of match is en hanced, and the firestick meaning is suppressed.
But after participants comprehend the sentence, "She saw the match," neither the fires tick nor the contest meaning is enhanced or suppressed.
When participants subsequently read the sen tence, "She blew out the match." they need the firestick meaning. If that meaning has been en hanced, then participants will reap a benefit. But if that meaning has been suppressed. then partic ipants will incur a cost.
It was proposed that when participants com prehend the neutral primes neither one meaning is enhanced nor the other meaning is suppressed.
An alternative explanation is that for each neu tral sentence prime, approximately half of the participants enhanced one meaning, and the other half enhanced the other meaning. with the net result being that average response times and error rates to the target sentences following the neutral primes would be halfway between the response times and error rates in the same-ver sus different-meaning conditions. This is exactly what we observed.
When reading a target sentence after reading a neutral prime. if half the participants were (in the above terms) reaping a benefit and half were incurring a cost, then neutral prime condition should be associated with more variance. However, the average of each participant's standar d deviation of his/her response time was not larg er in the neutral-meaning prime condition than in the same-or different-meaning prime condi tions. The same was true when we investigate d each item' s standard deviation.
In our second experiment we employed a cor roborating baseline that also demonstrate d equivalent costs and benefits of meaning. In this experiment, we again preceded each target sen tence by one of three prime sentences. Our same-meaning primes and different-meaning primes were identical to those of our first exper iment. However, instead of manipulating a neu tral-meaning prime as our baseline condition, we manipulated a no-meaning prime. for exam ple, "She prosecuted the match." We verified that at least 90o/c of our participants in a norming study confirmed that each no-meaning prime sentence did not make sense, but when pressed to say what meaning the sentence could imply.
even though it didn't make sense, no one indi vidual meaning was selected for each sentence by more than 60'7c of the participants.
Using participants' responses to the target sentences in the no-meaning condition as a base line. we quantified the benefit that participants reaped, a reliable 66 ms and 7%, and we quanti fled the cost that participants incurred, a reliable 127 ms and 8%. These costs are incurred because when participants read the prime sen tences. they suppress the meanings that they do not need. If they later read a target sentence that implies a meaning which they have suppressed.
as they did in the different-prime condition, they will be slower and less accurate. should reap benefits equivalent to those reaped by more skilled comprehenders. We tested these predictions by selecting 32 more skilled comprehenders, who scored higher than 75% on the written version of our multime dia comprehension battery (Gernsbacher & Var ner, 1988) . and 32 less skilled comprehenders, who scored lower than 70o/c on the comprehen sion test. We tested these more versus less skilled comprehenders on the experiment just described. The more skilled comprehenders reaped a reliable 70 ms-6o/c benefit, and they incurred a reliable 118 ms-5'7c cost. The less skilled comprehenders also reaped a reliable 97 j ms-9% benefit; however, they incurred very few costs. The1r l 0 ms-1 '7c cost was not statlStlcally reliable. These data support the hypothesis that the costs incurred by reading a different-mean ing prime are due to suppression; less skilled comprehenders, who are characterized by less efficient suppression. incur fewer costs.
How long do these costs and benefits of meaning last? We explored that question by pre : senting half the prime sentences immediately before their respective target sentence, as done before, and presenting half the prime sentences I five sentences before their respective target sen tence. The results demonstrated that when the 1 prime sentences immediately preceded the target 1 sentences, as they did in our previous experiments. participants again reaped a reliable 88 , ms-So/c benefit. and they incurred a reliable 77 ms-4% cost. When the prime sentences preceded the target sentences by five sentences. partici pants also reaped a reliable 53 ms-7% benefit: however, they did not incur a reliable cost when measured by either their response time or their error rate. We observed the same lack of cost but persistence of benefit in another experiment in which the prime sentences preceded the target sentences by seven sentences. These experi ments demonstrate another situation in which these costs and benefits of meaning are dissoci ated. The costs are relatively quick lived. but the benefi� last longer.
These dissociations of costs and benefits are not simply due to a ceiling effect. If we examine the data from the slowest third of the partici pants in our first experiment, we realize that even participants whose response times were an average l 00 ms slower in the baseline condition than any of the means shown so far, still in curred a reliable 149 ms-99c cost. Similarly, when we examine the data from the slowest third of the participants in our second experi ment, we realize that although their response times ranged into 1500 ms, they still incurred a reliable 134 ms-6% cost. Thus, the dissociation between costs and benefits that we observed for comprehension skill and for the distance be tween the primes and targets are most likely not due to a ceiling effect.
These dissociations suggest that these costs and benefits are not due to episodic retriem/. According to an episodic retrieval explanation, when participants read each prime sentence. they neither suppressed nor enhanced any mean ing. When they later read a target sentence that was similar to a prime sentence. they were re minded of the prime sentence. To the degree that the target sentence matched participants' mem ory of the prime sentence, they were facilitated or impeded in responding to the target sentence.
However, an episodic retrieval explanation would have to posit that our participants' mem ory of different-prime sentences faded more quickly than their memory of same-prime sen tences, and that our less skilled comprehenders had poorer immediate memory of only the dif ferent-prime sentences. Given that participants did not know when they read each sentence whether a later sentence would imply the same or a different meaning. the following can be concluded.
The benefits observed in these experiments are due to enhancement; the costs observed are due to suppression. When participants read a MORTON ANN GER:-.: SBACHER   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- sentence that contains a homonym they suppress the meaning that is not implied by the sentence.
When they later read a sentence that implies that previously suppressed meaning, they incur a cost. It can also be concluded that the costs in curred by suppressing an irrelevant meaning are relatively quick lived, whereas the benefits reaped by enhancing a relevant meaning last longer. Finally, with regard to group differences in suppression skill, less skilled comprehenders, presumably because they are characterized by less efficient suppression, incur little cost but reap equivalent benefits. Thus, a situation in which compromised suppression skill is advan tageous has been identified.
It will be interesting to see whether other groups who exhibit inefficient suppression in the other laboratory task that we pioneered -for instance, children diagnosed with attention defi cit disorder, adults with right-hemisphere dam age, and most relevant to the current volume, aging adults -also show benefits in this labora tory task in which compromised suppression pays off. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if research can identify other situations in which group differences in suppression skill are advan tageous. I believe that in most of life's demands, members of groups characterized by inefficient suppression will be plagued by an embarrass ment of riches.
